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THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Patrick J. Monahan'
Toronto
Thispaper reviews the evolution in the role andfonctions ofthe Supreme Court of
Canada over the past 25 years, and attempts to identify certain major challenges
facing the institution in the decades ahead. In the past 25 years, the Supreme Court
has movedfrom a traditional appellate tribunal to a body exercising a broader
supervisory function in the interpretation and the application of Canadian law .
Professor Monahan describes the nature ofthis evolution, and compares certain
key aspects of the Court's current caseload and performance with that of the
English House ofLords and the U.S. Supreme Court. He also reviews the continuing
debate over the legitimacy ofjudicial review under the Charter and argues that,
contrary to the claims of certain critics, the Court has been largely successful in
striking an appropriate balance between its own role and that ofthe legislative and
executive branches.
Cet article passe en revue l'évolution du rôle et des fonctions de la Cour suprême
du Canada durant les 25 dernières années, et tente d'identifier certains défis
majeurs qui attendent cette institution dans les décennies à venir. Au cours du
dernier quart de siècle, le rôle la Cour suprême estpassé de celui d'un tribunal
d'appel traditionnel à celui d'un organisme exerçant une fonction plus large de
surveillance dans l'interprétation et l'application du droit canadien. Le professeur
Monahan décrit la nature de cette évolution; il compare saperformance et certains
aspects clés des affaires venant devantelle présentementà ceux de la Chambre des
Lords d'Angleterre et de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis. Il fait aussi un tour
d'horizon du débat qui se poursuit concernant le contrôle judiciaire exercé en vertu
de la Charte; il soutient que, contrairement auxprétentions de certains critiques,
la Cour a réussiengrande partie à atteindre unjuste équilibre entre son propre rôle
et celui des branches législative et exécutive de l'État.
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I. Introduction
For most of its 125 year history, the Supreme Court of Canada has laboured in
relative obscurity . Indeed, when members of the judicial and legal community
gathered in Ottawa 25 years ago this week at a symposium marking the
Patrick J. Monahan, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Ontario .
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centennial of the Court's establishment, the recurring lament was that the
Court had played such a minor, almost inconsequential role on the national
political stage. 1 The Supreme Court was criticized for being unduly timid
in reviewing legislation and regulation and urged to assume a more activist
role, particularly in the defense of civil liberties. 2 Political scientist Peter
Russell, who described the Court's performance since becoming the
country's final appellate tribunal in 1949 as "somewhat anti-climactic",
nevertheless claimed to detect in recent changes to the Court's work the
beginnings of a more significant role for the institution. Russell focussed
in particular on the 1974 amendments to the Supreme Court Act which
abolished leave as of right in civil cases and provided that leave was to be
granted only in cases of national importance . Even the late Chief Justice
ora Laskin, although noting that different judges might have different
views as to the appropriate institutional role of the Court vis-a-vis the other
branches of government, emphasized in his remarks to the symposium that
controversy had ceased on the law-making role of judges .4 The issue for
Chief Justice Laskin was not whether judicial discretion existed, but how
and when it ought to be exercised. "Law is not some known and defined
entity secreted in Aladdin's cave and revealed if one uses the right
password", Laskin C.J. observed. "We do not believe in fairy tales any
more . . .-5
Yet whatever enlarged role might have been urged upon the Court in
the, mid-1970's, it is evident that no-one anticipated the growth in the
Court's policy-making function that has actually occurred over the past
quartercentury. Ofcourse, in 1975 no-one foresaw the subsequent enactment
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a constitutional change
which former Chief Justice Lamer has described as drawing the judiciary
"into the political arena to a degree that was unknown prior to 1982," 6
Along with the abolition of civil appeals to the Privy Council in 1949, the
enactment of the Charter represents one of the two most significant
developments in the Court's institutional history during the twentieth
century.
The papers from the Supreme Court Centennial Symposium, held in Ottawa on
September 27,1975, were publishedin a special issue inVolume 53 of the Canadian Bar
1

Review .
2 See D.

Gibson, "And One Step Backward : The Supreme Court and Constitutional
Law in the Sixties" (1975) 53 Can . Bar Rev. 621 .
3 See P.H. Russell, "The Political Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in its First
Century" (1975) 53 Can . Bar Rev. 576 .
4 B. Laskin, "The Role andFunctions of Final Appellate Courts : The Supreme Court
of Canada" (1975) 53 Can . Bar Rev. 469 .
5 Ibid. at 478 (quoting fromLord Reid's article "TheJudge asLawmaker". (1972) 12
J.S.P .T.L. 22).
6 Rt. Hon. Antonio Lamer (CanadianBar Association,
1998) [unpublished] .

St. John's, Nfld., 23 August
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This paper will review the evolution in the role and functions of the
Supreme Court ofCanada over the past 25 years, and attempt to identify the
major challenges facing the institution in the decades ahead. Inevitably, a
key element of the analysis is the definition of the proper relationship
between the courts and the other branches of government in the Charter era.
The Charter requires the courts to scrutinize the work of legislatures and
governments in a wide variety of contested and controversial policy areas,
ranging from abortion, to the rights of gays and lesbians, to the meaning of
racial and ethnic discrimination, tothe merits ofaffirmative action programs
and employment equity, and so on . Having been thrust into the midst of
these boiling political controversies, the Court has itself becoming the
object of increased scrutiny and criticism. Whereas 25 years ago
commentators were urging the Court to abandon what was regarded as an
attitude ofundue deference to legislatures and governments, contemporary
critics now take exception to the fact that the Court has apparently accepted
and actedupon this advice . Two ofthe more prominent of the current critics
ofthejudiciary, Professors Ted Morton and Rainer Knopff of the University
of Calgary, complain that the Supreme Court functions "more like a de
facto third chamber of the legislature rather than a court" and that Supreme
Courtjustices have more influence on how Canada is governed than do all
the parliamentarians who sit outside of the cabinet.?
As Chief Justice Laskin observed twenty-five years ago, the fact that
judges on our highest court perform a creative law-making function as
opposed to merely `discovering' the law is hardly novel . What has changed
in the past twenty-five years is not the fact of judicial discretion but the
frequency of its exercise and impact . Yet if the range of circumstances and
occasions on which the Supreme Court is called upon to review the
decisions oflegislatures has expanded, this is attributable to the decision by
the country's political branches in 1982 to entrench fundamental rights in
our Constitution . Moreover, an expanded role for the judiciary in defense
of individual and collective rights is by no means unique to Canada, but
represents the Canadian manifestation of a global trend towards the
constitutional entrenchment of judicially-enforceable rights guarantees .$
The challenge for the courts, then, is not to ignore their new political
responsibilities but to come to terms with them in a manner that strikes an
appropriate and fair balance between the role of the judiciary and that ofthe
other branches of government.

F.L. Morton & R. Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party
(Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000) at 58 .
See C.R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, andSupreme Courts in
Comparative Perspective (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1998) ; K. Malleson, "A
British Bill ofRights: IncorporatingtheEuropean Convention on HumanRights" Choices,
5 :1 (June 1999) 21.
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Inmy view, despite the claims ofthe critics, the Supreme Court ofCanada
has been highly sensitive to the importance of striking such a fair balance and
has beenlargely successful in achieving it. Inshort, the enactment ofthe Charter
has been a positive development for Canadian democracy, an, assessment the
vast majority of Canadians seem to share.9 But the debate over the proper
judicialrole in an era_ofincreased activism remains in its relative infancy, with
the Supreme Court having only just begun to meaningfully redefine the
appropriate role of the judiciary as distinct from that of legislatures and
governments. Inthis paper Iwill offer a numberofmodest suggestions as tohow
this ongoing effort at definition can be constructively advanced in the years
ahead.
][[ . .The;Role and Functions ofa Final Appellate Court
Atthis Court's centennial symposium, ChiefJustice Laskin distinguished and
contrasted the Court's traditional appellate function from what he described as
its "supervisory role" . 10 The traditional appellate function is one of `error
correction', in which the appeal court reviews the findings of lower courts in
order to determine if a legal error has occurred . The primary purpose of such
error correction is to ensure that the resolution of a dispute has occurred in
accordance with established legal principles . As such, the traditional appellate
function is primarily for the benefit of the particular litigants as opposed to for
the good of the legal system as a whole.
In contrast; Chief Justice Laskin identified the `supervisory role' of the
Court as requiring the Courtto "oversee the development ofthe law in the courts
ofCanada, to give guidance to the provincial courts and to the Federal Court of
Canada on issues of national concern.. ." 11 Thus the supervisory function
involved deciding cases with aview to the impact'ofthe reasoning and result on
the legal system and Canadian law generally . Laskin C.J. had little doubt as to
which ofthese two roles was more significant: in his view, the supervisory role
represented "the paramount obligation of an ultimate appellate court with
national authority" .
BoraLaskin was surely right in placing greater weight onthe supervisory
function as opposed to the traditional appellate function of the Supreme Court.
Given the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada is a second level appeal court,
by the time litigants reach this level they will already have had at least one
9 See J. Fletcher & P. Howe, "Public Opinion and the Courts", Choices 6:3, (May
2000) 6 (reporting that 80 per cent of Canadians who have heard of the Charter say itis a
"good thing for Canada") ; and P. Howe & D. Northrup, "Strengthening Canadian
Democracy :TheViewofCanadians", PolicyMatters 1:5 (July 2000) 40-42 (reportingthat
Canadians by a 2-1 margin believe it is legitimate for the courts to overrule legislatures
when statutes are found to be inconsistent with the Charter).
10 Laskin, supra note 4 at 474.
11 Ibid. at 475 .
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opportunity to have the reasoning and conclusions of the court of first
instance reviewed for correctness . Indeed, the thrust ofthe 1974amendments
to the Supreme Court Act, which abolished the previous right of appeal in
civil cases above a monetary threshold and instructed the Court to grant
leave in cases of "public importance", seems premised on the idea that the
task of error correction is primarily the responsibility of provincial and
federal Courts of Appeal, with the Supreme Court dealing only with the
limited class of cases raising issues of broader public significance . 12
It is evident that in the past 25 years the Court has moved fairly
decisively in the direction envisaged by the 1974 amendments . First, the
Court now exercises considerable care in choosing its docket, granting
leave in only about 12 per cent of the applications for leave to appeal filed
annually. 13 This represents a significant tightening of the Court's leavegranting discretion from as recently as a decade ago, when the Court was
granting leave in about 18 per cent of applications filed . 14 Recent
amendments to the Criminal Code have also slightly narrowed the
circumstances in which there is an automatic right of appeal to the Supreme
Court in criminal cases . 15 The number of cases in which there is an
automatic right of appeal to the Supreme Court has declined over the past
decade, to the point where there is now just a handful of such cases each
year. 16 Thus for the first time in its history, the Court has now achieved
meaningful control over virtually its entire docket .
In my view, these developments reinforcing the Supreme Court's role
as asupervisory body overseeing the development ofCanadian law generally,
as opposed to a traditional appellate tribunal attempting to ensure the
`correct' result is obtained in individual cases, are appropriate and welcome .
In fact, as judges in a number of different jurisdictions have pointed out,
there are inherent limits on the ability of second-level appellate tribunals to
12 The enactment of the 1974 amendments had been preceded by a report by the
Canadian Bar Association which had emphasized that the Court's decisions did more than
simply resolve disputes between litigants, in that they alsoprovided "vital leadership to the
country in the interpretation and development ofthe law on all subjects ." See Report of the

Special Connnittee ofthe Canadian BarAssociation on the Caseload oftheSupreme Court
of Canada, vol. 1 (Ottawa : The Canadian Bar Association, 1974) at 34.
13 See Supreme Court ofCanada, "Bulletin ofProceedings:
Special Edition: Statistics
1989 to 1999" (Ottawa : Supreme Court ofCanada, 2000), which indicates that in 1998, the
Court granted leave in 70 of the 572 applications for leave submitted.
14 Ibid. at 4 (indicating that in 1989 the Court granted leave in 83 of the 465
applications submitted).
15 S
.C. 1997, c.18, enacting a new section 691(2) of the Criminal Code, which now
requires adissent on aquestion oflaw in the Court ofAppealfor anautomatic right to appeal
to the Supreme Court of Canada even where the Court ofAppeal has reversed an acquittal
at trial .
16 In
1999, for example, there were just 15 notices of appeal as of right filed with the
Court. From 1990-98 the average number ofnotices filed annually was approximately 47.
See Supreme Court Bulletin, supra note 13 at 4.
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serve an error-correction function effectively . For example, 75 years ago
Lord Atkin expressed the view that providing additional levels of appeal
was unlikely to increase the tendency of .courts to ascertain the `correct
result' in particular cases :
I will end with a statement of the 'proportion between successful and unsuccessful
appeals, whichmaybe of some interest . This proportion seems to be remarkably stable
at about 33 per cent . The number of successful appeals from the lower courts to the
Court of Appeal is about 33 per cent of the whole number, and the number of
successful appeals from the Court of Appeal to theHouseofLords is about33 percent.
There is no reason for believing that if there was ahigher tribunal still theproportion
of successful appeals to it would not reach at least that %gure.17 '
If there is a `natural' rate of successful appeals to the Supreme Court, it is
clearly.somewhat,higher today than it was in the English House of Lords in
the 1920's : appeals are successful in approximately 45 per cent of cases
heard by the Supreme Court of Canadal8 (this success rate is likely
attributable to the fact that, with control over its docket, the Supreme Court
is able to select for hearing only those appeals with reasonable prospects of
success l9) . Interestingly enough, the proportion of successful appeals in
the Supreme Court of Canada is broadly similar to that in both the
contemporary House of Lords as well as the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council.20 Yet, as Lord Atkin suggests, this success rate for appeals
does not necessarily indicate that justice as between individual litigants
requires access to a country's highestjudicial tribunal . In most cases, the
task of achievingthe `correct' result as between individual litigantsprimarily
involves issues of fact or of mixed fact and law, namely, the application of
the law to the facts of the case . There is no reason to assume that multiplying
the opportunities for appeal (in the form of second or even third-level
appeals) will lead to greaterprecïsion or `correctness' ,as between litigants,
since such additional appellate tribunals are no better placed than is the
initial trier offact and the firstlevel appeal court to apply the law to the facts
of the case . Thus the Attorneys General of Canada and the provinces have in
all likelihood been correct in resisting the call,that has been issued from time
to time to establish an additional or `intermediate court of appeal' to hear

A. Atkin, "Appeal in English Law" (1927) 3 Camb . L. J. 1 .
18 Of the 1294 appeals disposed of by the Supreme Court of Canada from 1989 to
1999, the appeal was allowed in 571 cases. See supra note 13 at 4.
19 Forexample,overthepastfiveyearstheSupremeCourthasgrantedleavetoappeal
in about 25 percent of the constitutional cases in whichleave is sought, but only about 10
per cent of civilcases. SeeH.S .Brown, B.A. Crane andChantal Leonard, "AnnualReport
on Applications,forLeave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada 1998-99" (Gowling,
Strathy & Henderson,1999) at 16-17.
20 Ov6rthe 1996-99period,therate of successful appeals to theHouse ofLords stands
at 47 per cent ', and.to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council at 40 per cent: see A.
Le Sueur and R. Cornes, "What do the Top Courts Do?", 53 Current Legal Problems
[forthcoming] Appendix, Table 1.
i7

380

LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN

[VOI.80

appeals from provincial courts of appeal before a matter could proceed to the
Supreme Court of Canada.2 l
The Supreme Courthears and decides significantly fewer cases today than
it did a generation ago. Whereas in the mid-1970's it was common for the Court
to hand down 150 judgments in a year,22 throughout the 1990's the court has
disposed of an average of 115 appeals annually.23 These numbers might
suggest to the casual observer that there has somehow been a decline in the
productivity or output of the Supreme Court over this time frame. But in my
view such a conclusion would not merely be unwarranted, but wrong . The
United States Supreme Court hears oral argumentin between 90to 95 cases per
year,24 while in the United Kingdom the twelve Lords of Appeal in Ordinary
(who comprise the permanent membership of the Appellate Committee of the
House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) hear
approximately 110 cases annually.25 These comparisons suggest that the
Canadian Supreme Court may well be hearing too many cases rather than too
few, given the importance of the legal issues raised and the need to ensure
adequate time for careful deliberation and reflection by the members of the
Court .
It might also be noted that in the past three calendar years there has been
a slight decline in the number of cases disposed ofby the Supreme Court.26 It
is not clear whether this most recent decline is attributable to a conscious
decision on the part of the Court to reduce its volume of cases or whether other
factors (such as the resignations oftwo members of the Court in 1999) were at
play. Regardless, it is clear that observers of the Court must be careful not to
21

This is nottodenythat ifsuch anintermediate court ofappeal werecreated, itwould
stimulate litigants withthe necessary financial resources to take advantage ofthe additional
appeal rights provided (this prediction is based on the theory that `if you build it they will
come') . Moreover, since there is always roomfor disagreement amongstjurists in difficult
or marginal cases a certain `natural' proportion of such further appeals would no doubt be
successful. Yet for the reasons outlined above, there is no necessary reason to assumethat
the result generally will be greater fairness as between litigants in particular cases.
22 The statistics for the 1970's and 1980's are set out
inP. Monahan, Politics andthe
Constitution: the Charter, Federalism, and the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto:
Carswell,1987) ch. 2. See also B. Laskin, "The Supreme Court of Canada: The First One
Hundred Years A Capsule Institutional History" (1975) 53 Can Bar Rev. 459 at 466 .
23 Between
1990 and 1999 the Court disposed of 1146 cases. See Supreme Court
Bulletin, supra note 13 at 4.
24 See "Federal Judicial Caseload: A Five-Year Retrospective", Table A-1, available
<
at http://www .uscourts .gov/publications> (providing figures ontheU.S. Supreme Court
caseload for 1993-97) . It should also be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court disposes of an
additional 90 to 100 cases on the merits annually without oral argument.
25 In 1998-99 the House of Lords heard 54 appeals, while the Judicial Committee
heard 52. The House of Lords disposed of an additional 17 cases without issuing a
judgment. It should also be noted that judges other than the permanent salaried Lords of
Appeal in Ordinary participate in the judicial functions ofboth top courts. See Le Sueur &
Comes, supra note 20 at Appendix.
26 Inthe 1998-2000 periodthe Court disposed of285 cases, an average
of78per year.
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draw any necessary correlation between productivity and sheer numbers of
cases decided, and that there is a real danger in the Court spreading its limited
resources too thinly over aunduly large number of cases. In this sense, a target
of 90 cases peryear, which would be comparable'to thenumber ofcases argued
before theUnited States Supreme Courtannually, mightwellbe an appropriate
benchmark for our ,Court in the future.
It. i s clearthat one of the significant challenges-facing the Court is the need
for vigilance andprudence in managing its docket . In that regard, one issue that
merits consideration is whether the full court (as opposed to a panel of three
judges only) should be involved- in decisions on leave to appeal applications .
The practice of having leave applications determined by panels of three judges
. seems a holdover from the period when there were oral hearings in such
matters. With leave applications now determined on the basis of a written
record ; there would seem to be no reason not to move to the United States
practice, where all nine judges .participate in decisions to grant leave 27
As might be expected, the granting of greater control to theCourt over its
own docket has resulted in a significant shift in the nature of the cases it hears .
Table 1 below sets but in summary form the evolution in the Court's caseload
during three, distinct periods in its history. During the first period, from the
establishment of the Court in 1875 until the abolition of appeals to the Privy
Council in 1949, private law matters dominated the court's docket: almost a
third of the approximately 4000 cases decided during this era raised issues of
tort, contract or real property . An additional 235 cases decided by the Court
during this early period involved railways, an indication of the importance of
this mode of transportation to the economic life of the country at the time.
Issues of criminal law and constitutional law were near the bottom of the list
in terms ofthe Court's caseload . Indeed, during thefirst 75 years ofthe Court's
_- existence there were almost as. many wills cases as there were constitutional
cases to reach the Dominion's highest domestic judicial tribunal.28 Overall,
approximately two-thirds of the cases reaching the Court did so based on the
automatic right of appeal in civil cases over a defined monetary limit29
During the second period, following the abolition of appeals to the
Privy Council but while there was still a right of appeal in certain civil cases,
the Court's docket swung significantly in the direction of -public law. The
number of criminal andtax cases, which together had accounted for about9 per,
cent of the Court's cases prior to 1950, increased dramatically and comprised
about 27 per cent of the approximately 1500 decisions of the Court between
1950 and 1969 . Still, private law matters continued to occupy a significant
of the nine members oftheUnited States Supreme Court
is required in order- to grant certiorari .
28 Also of interest is the factthat there were 75 casesinvolving controverted federal
elections, an indication of the important role played by the Court in nurturing and
. reinforcing democratic political institutions during the early years, of the country.
29, See Russell, supra note 3 at 588.
27 The concurrence offour

TABLE 1 : CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 1875-1999
1875-1949
1950-1969
APPEALS HEARD 1999
% of
% of
% of
cases in
cases in
cases in
which
which
which
issue
issue
issue
arose
arose
arose
Tort

12.0

Criminal

14.4

Criminal Law

43

Jurisdiction

11 .4

Taxation

13.1

Charter (civil and criminal)

12

Contract

10.5

Tort

9.1

Commercial Law

9

Real Property

10.0

Contract

7.2

Family Law

5

Procedure (Public)

6.7

Procedure (Public)

6.9

Administrative Law

4

Railways

5.7

Real Property

6.8

Civil Rights

4

Insurance

5.2

Motor Vehicles

5.5

Constitutional Law

4

Municipalities

5.2

Jurisdiction

5.2

Labour Law

4

Taxation

4.9

Evidence

4.2

Property Law

4

Criminal

4.7

Constitutional

3.9

Taxation

4

Constitutional

4.3

Labour

3.9

Torts

3

Wills

3.8

Municipalities

3.7
Others
4
Source : The data for the first two periods is reproduced from Russell, supra note 3 at 582. The data for 1999 is found in the
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portion of the Court's time, with tort, contract, and real property, cases
comprising about 23 per cent of the caseload . Railway.litigation was replaced
by motor vehicle cases, while a new area of law, labour law, emerged as a
distinct and significant category.
The comparable figures for the 1999 calendar year indicate the fairly
dramatic nature of the shifts that have occurred in the Court's docket over the
past 25 years following the abolition of appeals as of right in civil cases.
Although often depicted in media commentary as primarily a constitutional
court-, in realitynon-constitutional criminal lawmattersnow representbyfar the
largest single category of case reaching the Court. Charter, constitutional and
civil rights issues form the second largest group of cases, comprising between
20 and 25 per cent ofthe Court's docket .30 Tort and property law cases, which
topped the caseload list prior to 1949, have now fallen to the bottom . The
frequency of tax cases has declined significantly from the 1950-69 period ; no
doubt due to the establishment of a specialized tax court in 1970 devoted
exclusively to dealing with tax matters, with appeals to the Federal Court of
Appeal.
Another criticism that is sometimes made of the Court is that there are too
many dissenting or concurring opinions, with the result that lower courts,
lawyers and litigants are unable to determine the correct application of the law
in future cases. As I will suggest later, it is sometimes desirable for the Court to
deliberately leave difficult issues undecided or somewhat obscure, so as to
provide scope for further debate and reflection on a matter prior to a final
resolution . In any event, the claim that the justices of the Court are unduly
divided orfractious is simply unsupported by the empirical evidence.'Over the
past ten years, the Court has -been unanimous in just over 70 per cent of its
judgments 3 1 This is comparable to the rate of unanimity in the House of
Lords32 and is far higher than the rate of unanimity in the U.S . Supreme
COUrt .33
3o Although Charter and other constitutional cases comprised less than 20 per cent
of the Court's docket in 1999, over the past decade constitutional cases have represented
between 20 and 25 per cent of the Court's caseload. For the relevant figures see: P.
Monahan, "The Supreme Court ofCanada in 1999: TheYear in Review", Canada Watch
8:1 (October 2000) 3.
31 See Supreme Court Bulletin, supra note 13 at 4.
32 In
1998-99, the House of Lords was unanimous in 46 out of 63 decisions, a
unanimityrate of73 percent. It should also be notedthattheHouse of Lords sits inpanels
of five, as opposed to seven or nine ; arguably it should be easier to attain unanimous
agreement amongst a smaller number of justices .
33 The U.S. Supreme Court is unanimous in approximately 40% of its decisions in
cases argued on the merits . See H.J. Abraham, The Judiciary: The Supreme Court in the
Governmental Process, 10th ed. (Dubuque, IA: Wn. C. Brown, 1996) at37; S . Brenner&
T.S. Arrington, "Unanimous Decision Making on the U.S . Supreme Court: Case Stimuli
andJudicial Attitude's", in H.J. Spaeth & S. Brenner, eds., Studies in U.S. Supreme Court
Behaviour (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990) at 207-20 and "The Supreme Court in
the Nineties : A Statistical Retrospective", (2000) 114 Harv. L.R. 402 at 408
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Intervenors have come to play an increasingly important role in Supreme
Court of Canada litigation, particularly in constitutional cases : over one-half of
the constitutional cases decided between 1996 and 1999 have featured
intervenors .34 This is in stark contrast to the situation as recently as the late
1980's, when the Supreme Court was criticized for being overly restrictive in
granting third parties the right to make submissions . While Attorneys General
remain the most frequent intervenors (which is unsurprising, given their
automatic right to intervene in constitutional cases), non-profit organizations,
including registered charities, law-related organizations, industry associations
and other non-profits, have become frequent intervenors at the Supreme Court
leve1.35
Before 1987 it was generally not possible to intervene in a criminal case,
with the Supreme Court taking the position that criminal cases involve the state
as the `singular antagonist' ofthe individual accused .36 In the 1990's, however,
itbecame common to permit interventions in criminal cases . For example, there
were intervenors in 28 of the criminal law constitutional cases decided between
1996 and 1999. Moreover, in suchcases there were typically intervenors onboth
sides ofthe issue.For example, in the recent Mills case,37 dealing with the right
of an accused person to obtain psychiatric records of a complainant in a sexual
assault case, there were a total of 18 intervenors, including 8 Attorneys General
and 10 non-governmental bodies or persons . Although it is not clear from the
Court's opinion precisely what position was taken by the various intervenors,
most ofthem appear to have intervenedin support ofthe constitutionality ofthe
legislation and against the position taken by the accused, whose liberty was at
stake in the proceeding.
It is not obvious why an individual accused in a criminal case should be
required to confront not only the Crown but also an array of other groups and
organizations. This is particularly so when these other organizations are
typically far better funded than the individual accused and may in fact be
receiving government funding in the form of grants, subsidies or tax credits.
In August of 1999 the Supreme Court announced that, in future, it would
strictly enforce the 60-day time limit for the filing of interventions and stated
that intervenors should not normally expect the right to make oral submissions
See Monahan, supra note 30 at 5.
For example, in the 1996-99 period, there were a total of 127 intervention
appearances by public interest organizations (including registered charities and other nonprofits) as intervenors in Supreme Court cases. This compares with just 8 intervention
appearances by corporations, 6 by trade unions and 17 by individuals during this time
frame. See ibid. at 6.
36 The use ofthe `singular antagonist' terminology to
describe criminal litigation has
never been employed in the context of applications for intervenor status (since such
decisions are never accompanied by reasons). However, the Supreme Court has utilized
this terminology in applying the section 1 Oakes test in the context of criminal litigation.
See, for example, Irwin Toy v. Qu6bec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 .
37 R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 .
34
35

20011

The Supreme Court of Canada in the 21 1 Century

38 5

to the court.38 This decision to more rigorously enforce the existing Supreme
Court rules on interventions seems appropriate, particularly in criminal cases.
Moreover, while the Court has a clear interest in obtaining all relevant
information and viewpoints on important, issues of public policy, there is no
guarantee that the organizations who happen to seek intervention status in a
particular casewillprovide either abalanced or comprehensive analysis of such
information. Indeed, the Court may be led to believe that it has canvassed all
relevant viewpoints by virtue of a liberal or flexible policy on interventions,
when such is notthe case. Restricting intervenors to written submissions seems
to strike a more appropriate balance between the interest in obtaining relevant
information, on the one hand, andthe fact that the actual parties to the litigation,
whose interests are directly at stake, should remain the primary focus of the
proceeding, on the other. '
In summary, it is clearthatthe Courthas significantly redefined its roleover
thepast 25 years, moving decisively inthe direction suggested by ChiefJustice
Laskin in his remarks to the Court's centennial symposium in 1975 . Having
finally been granted control over virtually its entire docket, the Court is no
longer merely concerned with correcting legal errors, but with the broader
supervisory function ofgiving direction to lowercourts andCanadians generally
on the interpretation and development of the law.
Thequestionthat has been raised, of course, is whether the Courthas moved
too far in assuming such a supervisory role, particularly in its interpretation of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . It is to this debate over the
Court's Charter `activism' that I now turn.
III. Courts and Legislatures
Whilethe Charterremainsremarkably popularinallregions of thecountry, and
while Canadiansby awide margin continue to supportjudicial nullification of
statutes that violate the Charter, 39 the legitimacy of judicial review under the
Charter has come under increasing scrutiny in the media and amongst some
academics. The most articulate and developed criticism of the Court in this
regard has come from Professors Morton and Knopff.40 They argue that a long
tradition of parliamentary supremacy has been replaced by a regime of
"constitutional supremacy verging onjudicial supremacy." They maintain that
unelected judges interpreting the Charter have abandoned the canons of selfrestraintthat guidedthejudiciary in this country for overonehundred years, and
are now inappropriately substituting their views of policy for that of the elected
representatives of the people.
38 See "Notice to the Profession, August 26, 1999", in Supreme Court of Canada,
Bulletin ofProceedings (Ottawa: Supreme CourtofCanada, 10 September 1999) at 1313.
39 See Fletcher, supra note 9.
40

Supra note 7.
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It is important to place these claims of undue judicial activism in context .
First, the majority of Charter litigation involves a challenge to executive or
police action, as opposed to the validity of a statute 41 If the courts rule that a
searchofa suspect's home was carried out improperly, or thatan individual who
was arrested was denied his or her right to counsel, there has been no threat to
the proper functioning of our legislative institutions for the simple and obvious
reason that the legislature did not authorize or carry out the particular activity
that was the subject of constitutional challenge . Moreover, in cases where the
courts find that government or police officials have engaged in activities that
have violated an individual's rights, it is typically on the basis that the proper
procedure was not followed.In suchcases, it is usually arelatively straightforward
matter for the legislature to cure the procedural defect through the enactment of
remedial legislation. Forexample, in R. v. Feeney42 the Courtruled thatasearch
warrant was required before entering a private residence in order to make an
arrest . There was at the time no Criminal Code procedure for obtaining such a
warrant . Since police officers had entered Feeney's home without a warrant, the
evidence they obtained was excluded and his conviction was overturned.
However, within six months of the decision, Parliament amended the Code to
establish a procedure for obtaining search warrants to enter private residences
to make an arrest and, in certain exceptional cases, to undertake a warrantless
search .43
It seems clear that Feene_y cannot be characterized as ajudicial usurpation
ofParliamentary authority since, prior to the litigation, Parliament had not even
turned its mind to the issue raised by the case. In fact, the effect ofthe Supreme
Court's decision was to require Parliament (rather than the judiciary) to
determine an appropriate set ofrules to govern searches of private residences.
Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that the requirement tofollow the new
procedure mandated by Parliament has impaired the ability of police to
apprehend and prosecute suspects who take refuge in private residences44 In
the result, the public interest in effectively investigating and prosecuting crime
has been shown to be entirely compatible with the need to respect individual
rights protected by the Charter.

41 Approximately 55 per cent of Supreme Court of Canada Charter cases involve
challenges to executive orpolice action as opposed to the validity ofstatutes orregulations.
See P. Monahan, "The Supreme Court ofCanada's 1998 Constitutional Cases: The debate
overjudicial activism heats up", Canada Watch 7:4-5 (October 1999); J.B . Kelly, "The
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Rebalancing of Liberal Constitutionalism in
Canada, 1982-1997" (1997) 37 Osg. Hall L.J. 625 at 654 .
42 [199712 S.C.R. 13.
43 S .C. 1997, c. 39, s. 2 (adding sections 529-529.5 to the Criminal Code) .
44 It should also be noted the Mr. Feeney himself was tried a second time following
the Supreme Court decision overturning his first conviction. Even though the police were
prevented from introducing the illegally obtainedevidence, he was convictedat the second
trial .
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What of those cases in which the Supreme Court does rule statutory
provisions or regulations invalid due to inconsistency with the Charter or with
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982?As of December 31, 1999, there were
64 such instances, involving 34 federal and 30 provincial statutes 45 One factor
to keep in -mind in assessing the impact of these statutory or regulatory
nullifications is that 20 of the 34 federal provisions that were declared invalid
involved -procedural matters .46 In such cases it is typically a relatively
straightforward matter for Parliament to cure the defect by enacting a remedial
statute with more appropriate procedural protections . For example, in Hunter
v. Southam¢7 the Supreme Court struck down the search and seizure provisions
in the Combines Investigation Act on grounds that there was no provision for
prior independent review by a judicial, officer of the appropriateness of the
search.Parliamentsubsequentlyamended.thelegislationtoprovidethatsearches
couldnotbe conducted without the priorissuance ofa search warrant approved
by ajudge48 Another example is R. v. Swain'49 in which the Supreme Court
struck downprovisions in the Criminal Code providing forautomaticcommittal
ofpersons acquitted for insanity . Soon after the decision, Parliament amended
the Code to provide a procedure involving review, boards and disposition
hearings insuch cases50 As KentRoachsuggests,inhis review ofParliament's
response to the Court's decisions in this 4rea: 51
Instead of police officers exercising their own discretion to conduct warrantless
searches,Parliament has explicitly authorized such searches inprescribed andlimited
contexts . This imposes legal limits and accountability on police powers andhopefully
has promoted democratic debate that has made society more aware of police powers .
Overall, however, slightly more than half (38164) of the statutory orregulatory
provisions that have been declared invalid by the Supreme Court of Canada
since 1984 have involved substantive rather thanprocedural provisions. It is this
relatively limited but not insignificant group of cases that has given rise to the
criticism that the Court has improperly assumed a legislature as opposed to
judicial role in its constitutional decisions.
The data for'1998 and 1999 isbased on databompiled by the Centre forPublic Law
and Public Policy of Osgoode Hall Law School and reported in Monahan, supra note 30.
46
While the, majority offederal, statutes declared invalid involvedprocedural issues,
the overwhelming majority of provincial statutes found to be invalid (24 of 30) involved
substantive rather than procedural provisions . Assuch, the commentary in this paragraph
has less force in relation to provincial statutes .
47 [198412 S.C.R. 145.
49 See
the- Competition Act, S .C . 1986, c . 26, s. 124.
49 [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 .
50 See S.C. 1991, c. 43, s . 672.12.
51 K. Roach, "Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues between the Supreme
Courtand Canadian Legislatures" (September 2000) [unpublished, prepared for Supreme
Court Symposium] at 59-60.
52 P. Hogg'8i A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures"
(1997) 35 Osg. Hall L.J. 75.
45
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Dean Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell, in their important and widely-cited
1997 article,52 argue thatthe potentially anti-majoritarian character ofjudicial
review under the Charter is avoided by conceiving ofjudicial review as part of
a "dialogue" between the courts and legislatures . Hogg and Bushell point out
thatthosejudicial decisions strikingdownalaw on Charter grounds havenearly
always left room for an alternative or substitute law to be re-enacted in a form
that still accomplishes the objectives of the original invalid law53 After
reviewing 65 different instances in which courts ruled legislation to be invalid
due to conflict with the Charter, Hogg and Bushell find that subsequent
legislative action of some kind occurred in 53 of the cases examined.
An indicationofthe influential nature of the Hogg-Bushell article is the fact
that this `dialogue theory' was almost immediately adopted by the Supreme
Court of Canada . In Vriend, Justice Iacobucci, writing on behalf of 8 of the 9
members of the Court, referred with approval to the Hogg-Bushell article,
stating that the "dynamic interaction among the branches of governance. ..has
been aptly described as a 'dialogue . ..... 54 Iacobucci J. pointed out that the
Charter dialogue between courts and legislatures promotes accountability and
enhances democratic values, since "[t]he work ofthe legislature is reviewed by
the courts and the work of the court in its decisions can be reacted to by the
legislature in the passing ofnew legislation (or even overarching laws under s.
33 of the Charter)"5 5
The influential character of the HoggBushell thesis reflects its empirical
accuracy : a review of the evidence they have marshalled clearly demonstrates
that a court decision on a constitutional issue is rarely the final word on the
matter.56 Nor should this conclusion come as a surprise, since it is entirely
consistent with findings that have become widely accepted amongst scholars

53 The authors point to four features ofjudicial review under the Charter which in
their view facilitate such adialogue : (i) section 33 of the Charter, whichpermitslegislative
bodiestooverride the effect ofa court decisionincertain casesbyinserting a'notwithstanding'
clause in the impugned legislation ; (ii) the Oakes testunder section 1 ofthe Charter, which
requires the Courtto evaluate possible alternativesto theimpugned legislation (and which
usually results in the Court suggesting aless restrictive measure which would satisfy the
Charter concerns); (iii) certain Charter rights, such as the guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure in section 8, which are framed in qualified terms and which therefore
usually admit of a corrective legislative response; and (iv) equality rights claims which,
while requiring the legislature to accommodate an excluded individual or group, usually
do not prevent the legislature from achieving its original goal provided it is prepared to
extend the benefits of the law to the previously excluded class . See generally ibid. at 8291.
54 Vriend v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S .C.R. 493 at para. 138 .
55 Ibid. atpara.139. Hoggand Bushell werealso cited by the Supreme Court in Mills,
supranote 37, at para. 57(perMcLachlin and Iacobucci JJ., writing on behalfof7members
ofthe Court) .
5s A critique ofthe HoggBushell analysis is set out in C. Manfredi & J. Kelly, "Six
Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell" (1999) 37 Osg. Hall L.J. 513 .
However, these criticisms are largely answered in P. Hogg & A. Thornton, "Reply to `Six
Degrees of Dialogue"' (1999) 37 Osg. Hall L.J. 529 .
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studying in other fields of law . Indeed, the proposition that judicial decisions
rarely determine the distribution of social, political and economic entitlements
in society was the key insight of Ronald Coase in his classic 1961 article "The
Problem of Social Cost", 57 in which he demonstrated thatindividuals will seek
to bargain around legal rules in order to achieve. more efficient results. Coase
argued that, in the absence of transactions costs, parties will bargain to the
efficient result regardless of the liability rule announced by the court.58 What
was radical aboutthis thesis was theidea that ajudicial determinationofliability
might not conclusively dictate the allocation. of resources between parties.
The concept of governments (as opposed to private parties) bargaining
around adverse court decisions may seem somewhat more applicable in the
federalism context (where a judicial finding of invalidity merely involves a
determination that the `wrong' level of government has enacted a law, leaving
thefield open for.a substitute law enactedby another government)59 , thaninthe
context of Charter litigation (where a finding of invalidity, precludes the
enactment of a particular law by either level of government). What is common
in both the federalism and Charter contexts, however, is the phenomenon of
substitution of alternative legislative andregulatory instruments forthoseruled
invalid by the courts . This substitution process occurs because governments,
through control ofthe legislature, can cause the enactment of a law that pursues
the same objective but in a slightly different fashion.60
How is such substitution legally feasible in the face of a court ruling that a
legislative measure offends the Charter and cannot bejustifiedunder section 1?
In addition to the factors identified by Hogg and Bushell, of central importance
is the fact thatcommon law decision-making,including constitutional decisionmaking, is generally particularistic rather than universal. Common law courts
willgenerallyonly adjudicate inrelationto a specificfactual dispute, asopposed
to offering generalized advice as to the scope of governmental regulatory
authority.61 What is legally binding on future courts and legislatures is the
court-announced rule that was necessary in order toresolve the concrete factual
Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost" (1961) 3 J. of Law and Econ. l .
58 Of course, Coase also recognized that in the real world transactions costs are
always greater than zero, whichmeans thatparties will often fail to bargain to the efficient
result .
59 Elsewhere I have explored these questions in the context of federalism litigation :
see Monahan, Politics and the Constitution, supra note 22 at c. 10.
60 In this sense governments areinabetterposition than privateparties who generally
cannot cause the enactment of remedial legislation. Thus private parties are generally
forced to accept the law as declared by the courts . Itis forthis reason that they must resort
to bargaining in order to achieve an efficient result, notwithstanding the liability rule
announced by the court.
61 The exception, of course, the Court's advisory function on a reference. However,
only the Governor in Council hasjurisdiction to orderaReference andthe Courtretains the
discretion to refuse to answer a question with an insufficient factual record orfoundation.
See Reference re Secession of Qudbec, [1998] 2 S.C.R . 217 at paras. 25-26 & 105;
Reference re Canada Assistance Plan, [1991] .2 S.C.R. 525 at 545.
57
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dispute before the court. 62 In a constitutional case, the decision focuses on the
validity and application of a particular statutory provision to a specific set of
facts and parties . As such, the validityofalternative legislative mechanisms not
before the court is generally not authoritatively determined by a court decision
on the validity and application of a particular statutory provision. 63
The concrete, fact-specific nature of the common law decision-making
process is illustrated and emphasizedby the recent Supreme Court decisions in
Marshall. 64 In Marshall No. 1, the Supreme Court acquitted Donald Marshall
Jr. of charges laid for alleged violation of federal fisheries regulations. The
majority reasons of the Court, written by Binnie j.65, found that Mr. Marshall
had a treaty right to fish and trade for sustenance, that the fisheries regulations
failed to respect that right, and that Mr. Marshall had been acting within the
scope of his treaty right when engaged in the activity that gave rise to the
charges . Thus enforcement of the fisheries regulations in the circumstances of
the case would have been inconsistent with the constitutional recognition and
affirmation of treaty rights in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 .
The Court's decision in Marshall No. 1, issued on September 17, 1999,
provoked widespread confusion and even incidents of violence involving
aboriginal and non-aboriginal fishers and officials of the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans. It also led to claims that the treaty right to fish for
"necessaries" recognized in Marshall No.1 extended to a broad range of other
natural resources, including trade in logging or minerals or the exploitation of
off-shore natural gas deposits 66 As a result, one of the intervenors in the case
sought a rehearing before the Supreme Court, asking the Court to issue a stay
of the original decision acquitting Mr. Marshall and to "address the regulatory
authority of the Government of Canada over the east coast fisheries" .67
62 This
is what is known as the `ratio decidendi' of the case: see "Judicial Decisions
as Authorities", Halsbury's Laws of England, vol . 26, 4th ed. (London : Butterworths,
1979) at para. 573 .
63 Ofcourse, while adecision on the validity ofaparticular set ofstatutory provisions
does not determine the validity of alternative provisions not before the court, such a
decision may berelevantto the validity ofalternative provisions. However, this will depend
onaprocess of reasoning byanalogy and onwhether there are relevant similarities between
the statutory provisions in question . In this context, ` relevance' will depend on the nature
and scope of the rule announced by the court in reaching its initial decision. As I discuss
below, to the extent that a court frames its decision rule in narrow or specific terms, tied
closely to the facts before it, there will be a wider opportunity for legislatures and future
courts to continue agenuine dialogue on the issue.
64 R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 ("Marshall
No. 1") and R. v. Marshall, [1999]
3 S.C.R. 533 ("Marshall No.2").
65 Binnie J. wrote reasons concurred in by Lamer C.J., L'Heureux-Dub6, Cory and
Iacobucci JJ.; McLachlin J. (as she then was) wrote dissenting reasons concurred in by
Gonthier J.
66 See the discussion ofthese various extrapolations based on the result in Marshall
No.], as described in Marshall No.2 at paras. 19-20.
67
See Marshall No. 2, supra note 64 at para. 1 .
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On November 17, 1999, a unanimous ruling issued in the name of "The
Court" dismissed theapplicationforarehearing, stating that the application was
founded upon a basic misunderstanding of the scope of the Court's original
decision .68 The Courtpointedout that the litigation had involved aprosecution
of a private citizen and had required the Court to determine "whether precise
charges relating to the appellant's participation in the eel fishery could be
sustained." However, the legal effect of the decision to acquit Mr. Marshall
"was limited to the issues necessary to dispose of the appellant's guilt or
innocence" and did notaddress other issues not specifically before the Court on
theappeal 69 The Court went onto emphasize that its role is toresolve particular
disputes that arise between parties to litigation,, and that a court decision "is
authority only for the matters adjudicated upon." In asking the Court toprovide
generaladvice asto the scope of government's regulatory authorityoverthe east
coast fishery, the application for a rehearing "seeks to transform a prosecution
on specific, facts into a general reference seeking an advisory opinion of the
Court on abroadrange ofregulatory issues relating to the eastcoastfisheries."70
The. Court went on to clarify what the decision in Marshall No .l actually
decided and what .it did not decide.7 l Thus, for example, whether the same
fisheries regulations could validly be applied to a different set of facts, or
whether the treaty right recognized by the Court extended to other natural
resources, had not been determined . Moreover, the Court,made it clear that it
would only address these other matters in the future to the extent that they were
raised in the context of concrete factual disputes .
The particularistic nature of common law adjudication is a key element in
promoting the possibility of a dialogue between courts and legislatures, in the
constitutional as well as non-constitutional context 72 Because court decisions
are fact-specific and address the validity of a particular set of statutory
provisions, they leave open the possibility that a different result would follow
ifa different setofstatutory provisions were being appliedin a different factual
context. As such, particularistic court decisions that are fact-sensitive and
context-specific will leave more room for dialogue with the legislature than
would a court decision announcing a broad or sweeping new rule of law that
went far beyond the facts of the case .
Of course, it would be a mistake to overemphasize the particularistic
character of constitutional decisions of the, Supreme Court of Canada . Courts
resolve disputes in accordance with a rule or reason. Moreover, as discussed in
68 Ibid.
6s Ibid.
10 Ibid.

at para . 11.
at para . 11 .
at paras. 23 and 31 .
,
71 The Courtemphasized that mostof themattersraised on the motion forarehearing
had notbeen before theCourtin Marshall No.I andthus hadnotbeen dealtwithin the case.
72 As K. Roach, supra note 51, cogently points out, the concept of a `dialogue'
between courts and legislatures is applicable to the non-constitutional as well as the
constitutional context.
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the previous section ofthis paper, the role of the Supreme Court of Canada is
not limited to the resolution of particular factual disputes . The Court has, in
addition, an important supervisory function under which it must frame its
resolution of the dispute in accordance with rules that contribute to the
development of Canadian law. Thus, as Cass Sunstein has pointed out in his
recent importantbook One Case ata Time, 73 courts generally have considerable
discretion in deciding how broadly or narrowly they wish to frame the rule
which will serve as the basis for deciding a case .
Consider the Marshall case as an illustration . Marshall is what Sunstein
would describe as a `minimalist' ruling74 : the Court decided no more than was
strictly necessary to resolve the case before it, namely, that Mr. Marshall could
not be convicted for the particular activity that gave rise to the prosecution in
his case . TheCourt expresslyrefrained from a broader finding that thefisheries
regulations themselves were invalid, since the Attorney General had not
tendered any evidence orargument indicating whether theregulations couldbe
justified on the basis of the so-called `Sparrow test' .75 Of course, it would
certainly have been open to the Court to have achieved the same result - an
acquittal for Mr. Marshall - on the basis of a much broader rule, such as that
the fisheries regulations under consideration were necessarily inconsistent
with the treaty right to fish and were therefore invalid. But the Court preferred
a narrower rule, one that spoke only to the facts of the particular case, leaving
other issues not strictly necessary to the resolution of the case at hand to be
decided on another day.
Minimalist rulings are attractive in that they decide only a limited range of
issues, thereby leaving the greatest scope possible for potential responses by
the legislative and executive branches . As Sunstein argues, not only do such
decisions reduce the likelihood of large or permanent errors arising from
judicial rulings, they are also democracy-enhancing since they "increase the
space for further reflection and debate at the local, state and national levels,
simply because they do not foreclose subsequent decisions."76 This does not
mean thatjudges should always ornecessarily seek to frame their decisions in
the narrowestpossible terms, since there will undoubtedlybe cases where there
73 Sunstein, One Case ata Time: JudicialMinimalism on theSupreme Court(Boston:
Harvard U. Press, 1999).
74 Accordingto Sunstein, `minimalist' judges are
ones who "seekto avoid broadrules
and abstract theories, and attempt to focus their attention only on what is necessary to
resolve particular disputes...Theypay close attention to the particulars ofindividual cases.
They also tend to think analogically and by close reference to actual and hypothetical
problems." Sunstein, ibid. at 9.
75 R. v. Sparrow, [199011 S.C.R. 1075, sets out thetest that must be satisfied in cases
wherelaws orregulations infringe protected aboriginal ortreaty rights .Itwould appear that
the government chose not to tender evidence on the Sparrow test since it was of the view
that there was no treaty right relevant to the activities giving rise to the charge against Mr.
Marshall .
76 Sunstein, supra note 73 at 4.
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is a need for the courts to announce a broad rule that will categorically resolve
in advance a widerangeofpotentiallitigation. ButSunstein argues, convincingly
in my view, that judges ought to "indulge a presumption in favour of
minimalism".77 This is in keeping with Alexander Bickel's counsel that the
presence of the `least dangerous branch', while important, ought not to
overwhelm the role of the other branches of government in national political
life
There are a varietyofconstitutional doctrines or presumptions whichhave
been developed by the courts over the years which reflect or favour a
minimalist philosophy, in that they require the court to focus its analysis on
concretefactual disputes arising in alitigation context. One such doctrine is the
principle emphasized by the Court in Marshall No.2 to the effect that a court
decision is authority only for the matters actually adjudicated upon. But other
important principles reinforcing this same minimalist philosophy, particularly
in the constitutional context, include the "general rule in constitutional cases
not to engage issues which do not squarely arise for decision" 79 ; the doctrine
that, where a constitutional issue does arise for decision, courts "should not, as
a rule, go any farther, than is necessary to determine the main issue before
them"$ 0 ; the rule that courts will not deal with a constitutional issue in the
absence of a proper factual basis and context8 l ; the rule that courts will not
decide aconstitutional issue where the dispute giving rise to the litigation has
become moot82 ; and the rule that one person cannot base a Charter challenge
on the basis of violation of another person's rights .83.
It is important to recognize that the courts have by no means been entirely
consistent in applyingthesecounsels of restraintintheirconstitutional decisions.
As early as 1902, Lord Macnaghten described Sir Montague Smith's advice in
at 6.
See A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1962), in which Bickel develops the idea ofthe `passive virtues', according to which the
judiciary's willingness to decline jurisdiction is sometimes the wisest and best course of
action .
79 The Queen in right ofManitoba v. Air Canada, [198012 S.C.R. 303 at 320 (per
Laskin, C.f.C.). This doctrine has its origins in the Sir Montague Smith's well-known
statementin Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons (1881), 7 A.C. 96 at 109, to the effect that
"it will be a wise course for those on whom it is thrown to decide each case which arises
as best they can, without entering more largely upon an interpretation of the statute [the
British North AmericaAct] than is necessaryforthedecision of theparticular case inhand."
$o Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 at 419 (per Laskin C.J.C.).
81 Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Communications Workers of Canada, [1980] 1 S.C.R.
115 at 139-40 (per Dickson J. (as he then was)).
g2 Borowski v . Attorney General for Canada, [198911 S.C.R. 342 at 358-63 .
83 Irwin Toy, supra note 36. Note, however, the exception incases where a person
is charged with an offence under a law thatis alleged to beunconstitutional due to breach
ofa Charter provision. In such instances, aperson may raisethe Charter issueas adefence
to the criminal charge on the basis that no-one can be convicted under an invalid law: see
R . v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
77 Ibid.
7$

394

THE CANADTAN BAR REVIEW

[Vol .80

the Parsons case to the effect that courts should go no further than was
necessary to decide the particular question at hand as "often quoted but
not perhaps always followed. -84 Thus advisory opinions have always
been permissible under Canadian law.85 More recently, despite the
general rule against deciding moot cases, the Supreme Court has often
exercised its discretion and proceeded to decide cases that were moot
by the time they reached the Supreme Court leve1 . 86 The Court has also
significantly liberalized the law of standing, establishing what Dean
Hogg describes as a "very liberal rule for public interest standing" . 87
Nor, indeed, is it wise or appropriate for the Court to always attempt to
frame its decisions in the narrowest terms possible, since there are
often powerful countervailing considerations which argue in favour of
a broader ruling .$$
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence gathered by Hogg and Bushell
indicates that the Court has generally been mindful of the need to frame
its Charter analysis in such a way as to leave appropriate scope for a
subsequent legislative response. Consider the manner in which the
Court has approached the analysis under the two-part section 1 Oakes
test, in which the courts consider whether a law that limits a Charterprotected right can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society . The first part of the Oakes test asks whether the purpose
underlying the law is sufficiently important to justify limiting a Charter
right, while the second part of the test asks whether the limit is
proportionate to the objective pursued. It is evident that a ruling
striking down a law on the basis that it fails the first stage of the test is
far broader (and therefore more constraining on future legislative
action) than a ruling based on the second stage of the test . This is
because a ruling based on a finding that the law does not pursue a
"pressing and substantial purpose" prevents the re-enactment of any
subsequent law based on the same purpose. In contrast, where the
ruling is based on a lack of proportionality (the second stage of Oakes)
the focus is on the fit between the purpose of the law and the means
chosen to give effect to that purpose. As such, the ruling does not
preclude an alternative law which pursues the identical purpose, as
long as there is a better or closer `fit' between the purpose and the
84 A . G. Manitoba v. Manitoba License Holders Assoc., [1902] A.C. 73 at 77.
85 A .G. Ont. v .A.G. Can. (Reference Appeal), [1912] A.C. 571.
86 The cases are referred to and discussed by P.W . Hogg in Constitutional Law of
Canada, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at s. 56.3(c).
87 Ibid. at s. 56.2(d).
88 See thehelpful discussionin Sunstein, supranote 73 at262-63, wherehe points out
that "the case for minimalism is strongestwhen courts lack information that wouldjustify
confidence in a comprehensive ruling ; when the need for planning is not especially
insistent; when the decision costs, for later courts, of a minimalist approach do not seem
high; and when minimalist judgments do not create a serious risk of unequal treatment."
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means . Thus a Court committed to promoting the greatest scope for
democratic dialogue would prefer that any determinations of invalidity
be founded on the second part of the test rather than the first.
This is precisely the manner in which the Court has applied the
Oakes test . The Court has rarely rejected the legislature's judgment
that the objective of a law is sufficiently important to justify limiting
a Charter right.89 In the vast majority of cases where the Court has
ruled a law to be unconstitutional it has been on the basis that there
were less restrictive alternatives that could have been employed to
achieve the same legislative objective. Although the Court has not
expressly attributed this focus on this aspect of the Oakes test as
proceeding on the basis of a concern for promoting democratic dialogue,
the result is entirely consistent with such a concern.
There are certainly counter-examples where it might be asked
whether the Court has been sufficiently mindful of the need to frame its
rulings in a manner that is tied to the facts of the case before it.
Consider the important aboriginal, rights decision in Delgamuukw. 9o
The Supreme Court was unanimously of the view that a new trial had
to be ordered in that the trial judge had applied an incorrect test in
assessing evidence of oral history . However there were two separate
judgments setting out somewhat different approaches to the issues
raised . The reasons of La Forest J., concurred in by L'Heureux-Dubé
and McLachlin JJ ., were framed narrowly . La Forest J. emphasized that
the definition of aboriginal title and occupancy of land must be contextspecific and must fit within the framework established by the Court in
its earlier decision in Van der Peet. 91 In contrast, Chief Justice
Lamer.'s reasons, concurred in by Cory, Major and McLachlin JJ ., go
somewhat further, attempting to set out a general, theoretical framework
for the analysis of aboriginal title. A general definition of the content
of aboriginal title is provided,92 and it is also posited that there is an
"inherent limit" on the manner in which lands held pursuant to aboriginal
title can be used . 93

The Court's willingness to provide this kind of generalized guidance
on the scope of constitutional language is entirely natural and
understandable . The Court had devoted two days of argument to the
appeal, had heard from counsel for ten parties and/or intervenors, and
pored through a mountain of written material . Moreover, having ordered
89 See Hogg, supra note 86 at s. 35 .9.
90 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
91 R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, which required that tests of precision,
specificity, continuity and centrality must be met before an activity could said to be a
protected aboriginal right under section 35 ofthe Constitution Act, 1982.
,92 See Delgamuukw, supra note 90 at 1083 .
93 Ibid. at
1088 .
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a new trial, it may have seemed incumbent on the Supreme Court to
provide guidance to the trial judge as to the nature of the legal
principles to be applied. At the same time, the abstract and generalized
nature of the advice that was offered takes the Court into dangerous
waters . Certainly the principles announced by Chief Justice Lamer
went significantly beyond what was necessary to dispose of the appeal .
Moreover, given their highly abstract nature, it is difficult to predict
whether these principles will provide clear benchmarks for litigants or
judges in future aboriginal rights litigation . At the same time, by
announcing these principles in advance of a specific factual dispute
which would make such principles necessary to the decision, the Court
runs the risk of later having to revise or reformulate the principles .
A second situation in which it might be asked whether the Court is
going beyond what is strictly necessary to decide the particular case
before it is the practice of "reading in" words to a statute in order to
remedy a constitutional defect .94 Faced with a declaration of invalidity,
there may be a variety of ways in which a legislature may wish to amend
its law in order to conform with the court's ruling . If the court `reads
in' specific words to a statute in order to remedy the defect it has found,
it effectively selects the appropriate legislative remedy rather than
leaving that task to the elected legislatures . While the Court has stated
that the practice of `reading in' is to be employed only in "exceptional
circumstances", and while the practice of `reading in' can be justified
on the basis that in some cases it may well be less intrusive than a
declaration of invalidity, the difficult question is whether it involves
the Court in an essentially legislative as opposed to a judicial task.
Yet these counterexamples are in my view exceptions to the Court's
overall approach in constitutional cases, which has generally been a
cautious and measured one, sensitive to the need to avoid sweeping or
large statements that will bind future courts and legislatures alike.
Indeed, this assessment is confirmed by the widespread phenomenon of
legislatures enacting substitute legislation that achieves similar
objectives to that of legislation previously ruled invalid, as documented
by Hogg and Bushell .
If the Court wishes to enhance the possibility of a Charter dialogue
with the other branches of government in the years ahead, it must frame
its opinions in a manner designed to create the space needed to permit
such dialogue to occur. This means paying particular attention to the
various counsels of restraint described above95 and ensuring that,
where the Court chooses to disregard them and decide a case in
accordance with a broader rule than is necessary on the facts of a case,
94 See, forexample, Nliron v . Trudel, [1995] 2 S .C.R . 418, and Vriend, supra note 54 .
95 See authorities cited supra notes 79-83 .
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it proceeds with a full awareness of the broader implications of this
approach for its relationship with the other branches of government .
A. clear example of the kind of careful analysis that is appropriate
and necessary is the judgment of Sopinka J. in Borowski, 96 where
Justice Sopinka sets out a series of factors that must be taken into
account in assessing whether to decide a case where the factual dispute
which generated the litigation has become moot . As Justice Sopinka points
out, the Courtin such cases "must be sensitive to its role as the adjudicative
branch in our political framework." Where the Court pronounces judgment
in the absence of a dispute affecting the rights of the parties, this may be
viewed as ."intruding into the role of the legislative branch ." This does not
mean, according to Sopinka J., that the_ Court should never decide moot
cases, but merely that "it must be sensitive to the extent that it may be
departing from its traditional role ." 97
It is this kind of context-specific analysis, in which the Court carefully
considers its own institutional role in relation to the other branches of
government, that is called for in future cases . As Sunstein has emphasized,
whether to frame the decision in a particular case as narrowly as possible
cannot be decided in the abstract . While in my view there should certainly
be a presumption that narrowness is to be preferred over width, the law in
a particular area may have developed sufficiently, or the costs of leaving
issues undecided may be unduly high, such that a more comprehensive
ruling is needed. The overall result of such a context-specific approach will
be to ensure that an appropriate balance between the role of courts and
legislatures is maintained.
IV. Conclusion
The past twenty-five years has been a period of unprecedented challenge
for the Supreme Court of Canada. Not only has the Court been granted
control over virtually its entire docket, it has also been assigned the weighty
responsibility of measuring legislative and executive action against the
broadly-worded guarantees of individual and collective rights set outin the
Charter.

Inmy view, theCourt has respondedremarkably wellto these challenges .
It has assumed its new Charter mandate in a serious but measured manner,
attempting to balance the need to protect rights vigorously with arecognition
96 Supra note 82, above. Inthis case, Joseph Borowski was challenging provisions in
the Criminal Code which permitted abortions in certain circumstances on the basis that
theseprovisions violated the right to life ofthe foetus . However, priorto the case reaching
the Supreme Court, the Code provisions hadbeen ruled unconstitutional on the basis that
they violated women's right to security of the person. The issue raised by Mr. Borowski
had therefore become moot.
97 Ibid. at 362-63 .
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that legislative bodies must continue to govern in the public interest. The
continuing broad public support for the Court and the Charter amongst
Canadians is an indication that the balance achieved by Court has been very
close to the mark.
The Supreme Court of Canada has emerged as one of our most
important national public institutions . It also has a strong and growing
international reputation, with its opinions being cited and followed by other
national courts around the world . The challenge in the years ahead is clearly to
build incrementally on these achievements, ensuring that the traditions and
practices that have worked inthe pastaremodernized to fit changing conditions,
such that the Court's important role in national governance continues to be
exercised in a meaningful yet balanced manner.

